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WALKING ON THIN ICE: DOES THE REVENUE
PROCEDURE 2013-13 SIGNIFY THE DEMISE OF
LEVERAGED SPIN-OFFS?
NATALIA CARUSO*
ABSTRACT
Corporate taxpayers, when weighing leveraged spin-off transactions,
have long relied on the comfort of Internal Revenue Service rulings to
“bless” the deals. These transactions, when structured properly, are not subject to tax under section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) and
can potentially provide great monetizing opportunities to public companies.
Recent developments in the Internal Revenue Service’s ruling policy, however, removed the safety blanket companies had relied upon, as the Internal
Revenue Service announced its decision to cease the issuance of the rulings
addressing the deals’ qualification for tax-free treatment.
This Note will examine the history and the complex anatomy of leveraged
spin-offs and provide an analysis of conflicting views on nonrecognition
treatment afforded to the transactions. It will seek to shed light on the complexities involved in the structuring of the transaction and I.R.C.’s current
inability to effectively eliminate them.

*

J.D. 2014, William & Mary Law School. I would like to thank my husband for his
unconditional love and support; my family and friends, for their continuous encouragement; and the editors and staff of the Business Law Review, for their help and effort in the
publication process.

687

688

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:687

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 689
I. HISTORY AND POLICY UNDERLYING SECTION 355 SPIN-OFFS.............. 692
II. MECHANICS OF LEVERAGED SPIN-OFFS .............................................. 695
III. DISAGREEMENT AMONG PRACTITIONERS .......................................... 700
A. Arguments Supporting the Tax-Free Treatment of Leveraged
Spin-Off Transactions ..................................................................... 700
B. Arguments Supporting the Taxation of Leveraged
Spin-Off Transactions ..................................................................... 703
IV. THE 2013 NO-RULE LIST: IMPLICATIONS FOR LEVERAGED
SPIN-OFF TRANSACTIONS .................................................................... 705
CONCLUSION............................................................................................ 708

2015]

WALKING ON THIN ICE

689

INTRODUCTION
In 1986, after the Tax Reform Act repealed General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering,1 spin-off transactions under section 355 of the tax code2
became one of the only ways a corporation could avoid the corporate tax on
distribution of its appreciated property.3 Section 355 was designed to permit a tax-free division of a single corporation into two or more corporations
when certain requirements were met,4 on the theory that the division is
merely a change in the form of an enterprise that continues to be owned by
the same shareholders.5 The driving idea behind the tax-free provision was
to promote economic growth and encourage companies in extremely competitive markets to improve productivity without burdening businesses with
recognition of taxable gain on the transaction.6
When a complex tax-free spin-off transaction is structured properly,
the Internal Revenue Service (“the Service”) will respect its form.7 However,
many tax practitioners, as well as the Service itself, and tax-policymakers,
believe that corporate taxpayers engage in structuring transactions, otherwise
taxable, as tax-free reorganizations, thus manipulating one of the last remaining tax advantages of corporate restructuring.8 For instance, in a spin-off
1

296 U.S. 200 (1935). The Supreme Court held that corporations could distribute appreciated property to their shareholders tax-free. See id. at 206.
2
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code.
3
Liz Hoffman, Companies to Lose IRS Blessing On Spinoffs, LAW360 (Oct. 5,
2014, 11:31 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/454078/companies-to-lose-irs-bless
ing-on -spinoffs, archived at http://perma.cc/R9ST-3CNG.
4
See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(b) (1954).
5
See STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE TAXATION
789 (4th ed. 2008).
6
See H.R. Rep No. 1337, at 1–2 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4025;
see also STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 516 (4th
ed. 1997) (describing how Congress intended section 355 to provide corporations with a
tax-free mechanism to achieve a division divestiture that would be economically wise to
undertake except for the prohibitive tax cost that would otherwise be incurred on a sale of
that division).
7
See Alison Bennett, IRS Encouraging Discussion on Section 355 Deals No-Ruling
List, BNA MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS L. REP. NO.16, at 350 (2013).
8
See generally id. (providing that according to Amie Colwell Breslow, an attorney in
IRS Branch 4, one reason for the No-Rule policy is that it “became known” that there is
“something special” under tax code section 355); Debra J. Bennett, Obtaining Value from
an Investment in a Controlled Corporation, 89 TAXES 12, at 9 (2011) (summarizing
various section 355 monetizing techniques); see also Deborah L. Paul, Spin-Offs, Leverage
and Value Extraction—A Spin by Any Other Name ..., 91 TAXES 99, 3, at 99–101 (Mar.
2013) (arguing that current law relating to leverage and value extraction in section 355
transactions is form driven, and true reform of the law in this area would require upending
concepts such as the identity of the transferor and the realization requirement).
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transaction involving securities-for-debt exchange (a leveraged spin-off
transaction), a parent corporation uses securities of the controlled corporation (its subsidiary) to pay off the parent’s debt, which had been outstanding for some minimum period,9 and subsequently distributes (“spins-off”)
the controlled corporation to its shareholders in a tax-free section 355 transaction.10 Although the Service had generally tolerated such reorganizations, parent corporations “used this technique to raise cash to be retained
by the parent” itself—which monetized the transaction.11 The Service’s
approval of recent leveraged spin-off transactions despite extremely short
redemption periods of the newly issued debt by the parent corporation where
the “debt is born only to die”12 further revealed possibilities for extracting
capital from a subsidiary before spinning it off tax-free.13
Spin-off transactions are complex, and the potential tax exposures
from such transactions that fail to satisfy the requirements for qualification
under section 355 can be devastating to the parent corporation and its
shareholders.14 Accordingly, when considering leveraged spin-off transactions, public companies long relied on the comfort of the Service’s private
letter rulings to bless deals.15 Historically, private letter rulings could address the entirety of the spin-off transaction, reviewing all of the tax consequences, and providing the Service’s standing on whether the transaction
9

See Paul, supra note 8, at 104.
Debt-for-debt exchanges allow the parent corporation to exchange certain types of
debt securities of the controlled corporation for the parent’s outstanding debt without
regard to the tax basis of the assets of the controlled entity. See discussion infra Part II.
There have been various legislative proposals in recent years that generally would have,
if enacted, limited this flexibility to engage in debt-for-debt exchanges where the amount
of Controlled debt securities exceeds the tax basis of the controlled corporation’s assets.
See Matthew A. Rosen & Thomas F. Wood, New IRS Policies and the Future of Tax-Free
Spin-Off and Split-Off Transactions, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, at
4 (Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.skadden.com/insights/new-section-355-no-rule-policies,
archived at http://perma.cc/UR4T-RKUQ.
11
Jasper L. (Jack) Cummings & Edward Tanenbaum, Section 355 No-Rule Tightened,
ALSTON & BIRD TAX BLOG, at 2 (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.alston.com/taxblog/?entry
=4775, archived at http://perma.cc/5U8F-Z22M [hereinafter Cummings & Tanenbaum].
12
Amy S. Elliott, ABA Meeting: Practitioners Consider How Current Code Distorts
Leveraged Spinoff Decisions, 2012 TNT 220-5, 224 (Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Elliott,
ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off] (citing Deborah L. Paul of Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz).
13
See id.; see also Robert Rizzi, IRS Opens the Gates: Sara Lee’s Spinoff Ruling, 40
J. CORP. TAX’N 24, 24 (2013) [hereinafter Rizzi, IRS Opens the Gates].
14
Karen G. Sowell & Shane Kiggen, Role of the Step Transaction Doctrine in Section
355 Stock Distributions: Control Requirement and North-South Transaction, N.Y. ST. B.
ASS’N TAX SEC. REP. 1292, at 2 (Nov. 5, 2013).
15
See Hoffman, supra note 3.
10
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qualifies for tax-free treatment.16 The government, however, tweaked this
benign practice by removing the safety blanket previously available to corporate taxpayers through issuance of Revenue Procedure 2013-317 in January
of 2013. The Procedure is widely known as the 2013 No-Rule policy and
provides a list of areas in which the Service no longer will issue private
letter rulings.18 Specifically, the 2013 No-Rule policy announced that the
Service would no longer issue rulings as to whether a debt-for-debt exchange
in connection with a leveraged spin-off transaction is tax-free where new
debt of the distributing corporation is issued as part of the transaction.19
On June 25, 2013, the Service expanded its No-Rule policy with respect
to spin-offs through issuing Revenue Ruling 2013-32, which provides that
the Service will no longer rule on whether leveraged spin-offs qualify for
tax-free treatment, but instead will rule only on significant issues presented in
such cases.20 The Service’s decision to expand its No-Rule policy will
likely have the most significant impact on public spin-offs as section 355
transactions involving debt-for-debt exchanges are going to be subject to
increased complexity and uncertainty.21 The restrictive policy outlined in
this Procedure will apply to all letter-ruling requests received after August
23, 2013 and from that point, as the result of the change in the ruling policy,
corporate taxpayers wishing to proceed with the leveraged spin-off transactions will have to rely solely on the opinion of the counsel.22
Part I of this Note will give a historical perspective and the policy behind section 355. Part II will discuss the operation of section 355 in the
context of leveraged spin-offs and, specifically, the treatment of those
transactions by the Service prior to the issuance of Revenue Rulings in
2013. Part II will also discuss the divide amongst tax practitioners on the
tax-free treatment afforded to leveraged spin-off transactions. Part III will
compare the opinions by tax practitioners who view the transaction as purely
tax-motivated with those that find compelling policy reasons to permit
16

See Sowell & Kiggen, supra note 14.
Rev. Proc. 2013-3, 2013-1 I.R.B. 113.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
See Rev. Proc. 2013-32, 2013-28 I.R.B. 55, 56. See also IRS Limits Rulings to
“Significant Issues” in Certain Corporate Transactions, 119 J. TAX’N 4 (2013); Guidance Restricts Scope of Corporate Letter Rulings on Issues Involving Nonrecognition
Provisions, 72 TAX PRAC. 519, § 4 (July 8, 2013).
21
See Thomas R. May & Reza Nader, IRS Significantly Expands “No-Rule” Policy for
Spin-Offs and Other Corporate Transactions, BAKER & MCKENZIE, at 3 (July 15, 2013),
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Publication/6c64895c-80eb-46e0-a037-5419005e2053
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e377f83e-61f2-4fdd-bb75-ca5bbde03620/al_tax_irs
corporatetransactions_jul13.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UE8Q-DBLL.
22
See id. at 1, 3, 4.
17
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flexibility in the structuring of corporate division. Finally, Part IV will
discuss the most recent development in the Service’s treatment of the
transactions and will address the recent No-Rule policy.
I. HISTORY AND POLICY UNDERLYING SECTION 355 SPIN-OFFS
A spin-off is one of the most common types of tax-free corporate divisions permitted under section 355 of the I.R.C.23 In a spin-off transaction,
a parent corporation forms and contributes some of its assets to a new
corporation, a subsidiary.24 It then distributes the stock of this newly formed
corporation to its shareholders on a pro-rata basis with each shareholder
emerging as the result of the transaction as an equal owner in each corporation.25 Because a spin-off transaction involves a distribution of a parent
corporation’s property—the subsidiary’s stock—to shareholders without
the surrender of any of their stock in the parent company, the transaction
resembles a dividend.26
The tax law provided for tax-free treatment of certain forms of corporate
separations since the enactment of the first corporate reorganization provisions in the Revenue Act of 1918.27 The spin-off transactions, however,
were not included within the reorganization provisions until the enactment
of the Revenue Act of 1924.28 When spin-offs were originally introduced,
23

See generally I.R.C. § 355 (describing, in numerous subsections, a spin-off using
the terms “distributing corporation” and “controlled corporation” instead of the lay terms
parent and subsidiary).
24
See STEPHEN SCHWARZ & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE TAXATION 817 (5th ed. 2012).
25
Id. An example of a spin-off would be a corporation (C) that operates two businesses:
chicken ranch and winery. See id. A and B are equal and the only shareholders of C. See
id. C transfers all of the chicken ranch assets to a newly formed subsidiary (S), and then
distributes S’s stock pro-rata to A and B. See id. Immediately after the distribution, the
same two shareholders, A and B, own the two businesses’ operations in the same proportions as before, only now the businesses are contained in two separate entities rather than
as divisions of one corporate entity. See id.
26
Id. Dividends are distributions of property by a corporation to its shareholders due
to their ownership of corporate stock. Id. at 524. Although dividends commonly are paid
in cash, they may also take a form of stock in a corporation owned by a parent company
and generally must be included in the recipient gross income. I.R.C. § 301(c)(1).
27
Section 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 provided for nonrecognition of gain or
loss “when in connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolidation of a corporation a person receives in place of stock or securities owned by him new stock or securities
of no greater aggregate par or face value.” Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057,
1061 (1919).
28
Section 203(c) of the Revenue Act of 1924 provided that if there was a distribution of
stock or securities to a shareholder pursuant to a plan of reorganization without the surrender
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the purpose was to permit tax-free separation of one or more active businesses formally operated by a corporation.29 However, the poorly constructed
statute provided taxpayers with a convenient opportunity to distribute
assets from a corporate solution without incurring a shareholder-level
dividend tax and escaping dividend income. For example, a corporation
could transfer its assets to the newly created subsidiary, distribute the stock of
the subsidiary to the parent-company shareholders, and then liquidate the
subsidiary so the shareholders could obtain the assets. Upon liquidation of
the subsidiary, the shareholders would be taxed at capital gains rate rather
than ordinary income;30 thus, the shareholders effectively could utilize the
spin-off provisions to convert ordinary income from dividends into capital
gains treatment.31 This statutory blanket exemption from the tax on dividend
income remained available until the landmark case Gregory v. Helvering32
promulgated the business purpose test.33
Even before Gregory reached the Supreme Court, in light of staggering
concerns that businesses were being spun off solely for tax-avoidance
purposes, Congress rescinded the tax-free treatment formerly accorded to
of stock or securities by the shareholder, no gain would be recognized by the shareholder
from the receipt of stock. Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 253, 256–57 (1924).
29
House Comm. on Ways and Means, Internal Revenue Bill of 1921, H.R. Rep. No. 350,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10–12 (1921), reprinted in 95 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1909–1950: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS
(Bernard D. Reams ed., 1979).
30
Taxpayers paid 46 percent taxes for dividends at the highest tax rate, while capital
gains were taxed only at 12.5 percent. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, §§ 210,
211, 214, 43 Stat. 253, 264–71 (1924) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 210, 211, 214 (1924)). See
also Karim H. Hanafy, Section 355 Spin-Off + Section 368 Reorganization [Not Equal
to] Section 355(e). It’s Simple Math: The Anti-Morris Trust Bill Simply Does Not Add
Up, 1 H. BUS. & TAX L.J. 119, 123 n.18 (2001).
31
See discussion infra note 32.
32
293 U.S. 465 (1935). In Gregory, the taxpayer owned all of the stock of a corporation, which in turn owned certain securities the taxpayer wished to sell. Id. at 467. Rather
than distributing these securities as taxable dividend, the taxpayer caused the corporation
to transfer the securities to a newly formed corporation in exchange for its stock and then
distribute such stock to the taxpayer. Id. The taxpayer asserted that the described transactions qualified as a divisive reorganization, even though three days after receiving the
stock she liquidated the newly formed corporation to get hold of the securities, and reported a capital gain on the liquidation. Id. The Board of Tax Appeals agreed based on
the fact that the transaction fully complied with the literal language of the reorganization
provisions. Id. at 468. The Second Circuit in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d
Cir. 1934), and the Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935), both
reversed with the latter basing its decision on the theory that the transaction was a “mere
device” for bailing out Distributing’s earnings and profits at capital gain rates, not a genuine business-motivated restructuring as contemplated by the reorganization provision.
33
See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469.
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spin-offs.34 After several proposals to reinstate the spin-off as a vehicle for
tax-free reorganizations, Congress finally amended the Code in 195135 to
provide for a tax-free spin-off, taking the position that it was “economically
unsound to impede spin-offs which break up businesses into a greater number
of enterprises, when undertaken for legitimate business purposes.”36 However, Congress incorporated the device test to deter tax avoidance practices,37
which was finally replaced three years later by section 355, in substantially its
current form.38
There were no significant legislative changes to section 355 for thirty
years until the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine39 by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.40 The General Utilities doctrine provided that a corporation
generally could distribute appreciated property41 to its shareholders without recognizing any income at the corporate level.42 Congress repealed the
doctrine by imposing a corporate level tax on the distribution of appreciated
property to shareholders, as if the corporation had sold such property for
its fair market value.43 After the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, section 355 became “the most significant remaining statutory exception”44 to the
rule that all corporate distributions of appreciated property are subject to
34

See Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, 48 Stat. 680.
Compare id., with Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 317, 65 Stat. 452,
493 (1951).
36
S. REP. NO. 82-781, 2029 (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 2019.
37
To cure the infirmities revealed by Gregory, the Act subjected spin-off transactions
to section 39.112(b)(11), under which a spin-off was presumed to be tax-free unless it
appeared that a corporation that was a party to a reorganization “was not intended to
continue the active conduct of a trade or business after such a reorganization or ... the
corporation whose stock [was] distributed was used principally as a device for the distribution of earnings and profits to shareholders.” I.R.C. § 39.112(b)(11) (1954).
38
See Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 355(b), 68A Stat. 114 (1954); see
also Donald F. Bronson, Spin-Offs Before and After the Tax Reform Act, 38 BUFF. L. REV.
157, 162 (1990) (stating the requirements of the section generally resembled those placed
on corporations since Gregory, with the objective to prevent the use of spin-offs as a
means of converting shareholder-level dividend income into capital gain).
39
See General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 206 (1935). The
doctrine had been codified under section 311(a)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1954. See
SCHWARZ & LATHROPE, supra note 24, at 541.
40
See Pub. L. No. 99-514 §§ 631–33, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified in I.R.C. §§ 311, 336, 337).
41
Appreciated property is property that has a fair market value in excess of its basis.
See I.R.C. § 311(b)(1)(B). Property’s basis is its cost. I.R.C. § 1012.
42
See General Utilities, 296 U.S. at 206.
43
See I.R.C. § 311(b).
44
John R. Wilson, A New Spin on Corporate Spin-offs: Rev. Proc. 96-30, 25 CORP.
LAW. 109, 111 n.1 (1996).
35
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double taxation.45 Retaining the tax-free principle as its core, section 355
has been the primary means of effecting spin-off transactions.46
Naturally, Congress feared that after 1986 “tax-free spin-offs could be
utilized as an escape hatch to distribute appreciated property ... out of corporate solution tax-free.”47 In response to this concern, in the following years,
Congress amended section 355 to deny tax-free treatment when shareholders or the parent corporation itself has acquired control of the subsidiary during the five-year period preceding the spin-off.48 The section was
further revised to render certain distribution taxable to distributing corporation49 so as to capture all of the transactions it intended to prevent.
II. MECHANICS OF LEVERAGED SPIN-OFFS
As discussed in Part I of this Note, section 355 generally permits a corporation to distribute appreciated stock of a subsidiary corporation to its
shareholders without triggering any gain at either the corporate or shareholder level if the transaction meets an intricate set of statutory and judicial
requirements.50 The fundamental tax policy principle underlying tax-free
treatment of spin-offs is that the division is “merely a change in the form
of an enterprise that continues to be owned by the same shareholders.”51
While current law does impose constraints, depending on how the spin-off
45

Id.
Id. at 109. In the absence of section 355, if the fair market value of a subsidiary’s
stock were to exceed the adjusted basis in the hands of a parent corporation, section
311(b) would require that the parent recognize a gain equivalent to the appreciation of the
distributed stock. I.R.C. § 311(b). In addition, the shareholders of the parent corporation
would have to include in their income the fair market value of the stock, which would be
taxable as a dividend. § 301. Section 355, however, steps in to provide that no gain or loss
will be recognized by the shareholder of a corporation who receives stock of the corporate subsidiary, so long as the transaction meets certain conditions. § 355(a). Thus, the tax
on such distribution would be completely deferred until the shareholders sell the stock.
On receipt of the stock, the shareholders take a carryover basis under section 368(a), and
they would be subject to only one level of tax, at capital gain rates, upon disposition.
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D), (2)(H)(ii).
47
Hanafy, supra note 30, at 125.
48
I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(D).
49
I.R.C. § 355(d)(2)(A)–(B). Section 355(d) applies where a person purchases stock
of a parent corporation within five years preceding the spin-off of a corporate subsidiary,
and such stock either: (1) represents 50 percent or more of the parent’s outstanding stock
after the spin-off, or (2) results in the purchaser receiving 50 percent or more of the outstanding subsidiary’s stock in the spin-off. Id.
50
See I.R.C. § 355.
51
Jeffrey M. Trinklein & Kathryn A. Kelly, Overview of US Corporate Taxation in
2012–2013, in CORPORATE TAX 188 (William Watson ed., Global Legal Group 2013)
(citing to various subsections of I.R.C. § 355).
46

696

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:687

is structured,52 taxpayers often may extract value from the controlled subsidiary by utilizing permissible alternative transactions.53 For example, if a
subsidiary transfers cash to the parent corporation, the cash is tax-free only
to the extent of the parent’s tax basis in the controlled subsidiary;54 on the
other hand, debt securities can be distributed tax-free without the same
basis limitation.55
Absent basis limitation, leveraged spin-off transactions generally provide
the most beneficial results to taxpayers.56 In the typical leveraged spin-off,
a subsidiary issues its debt securities to the parent corporation57 and the
parent corporation then exchanges those debt securities with the parent’s debt
holders for its own debt.58 For example, the parent corporation issues
short-term debt to a lender (e.g., an investment bank) in exchange for cash
and subsequently transfers some assets to its subsidiary in exchange for
subsidiary’s stock or securities.59 The parent corporation then retires incremental amounts of its newly issued debt by exchanging it with the lender
for the subsidiary’s stock or securities.60 At the same time, the parent corporation distributes the remaining subsidiary’s stock or securities to the
parent’s shareholders in a tax-free section 355 spin-off. 61 Ultimately, the
52
To qualify as a tax-free spin-off under section 355, a corporate division must satisfy a
number of statutory requirements: A parent corporation must control the stock or securities of a subsidiary immediately prior to spin-off, and it also must distribute all of the
subsidiary’s stock or securities or an amount of stock sufficient to constitute control.
I.R.C. §§ 355(a)(1)(A), (D). The “control” requirement is defined as an ownership of 80
percent of the total combined voting power and 80 percent of the total number of shares
of all classes of stock. § 368(c). Furthermore, both the parent corporation and subsidiary
must be engaged immediately after the spin-off in an actively conducted trade or business,
which has been so conducted throughout the five-year period ending on the date of the
spin-off. §§ 355(a)(1)(C), (b). The spin-off transaction may not be used “principally as a
device for the distribution of the earnings and profits” of either the parent or subsidiary.
§ 355(a)(1)(B). In addition to statutory tests, a spin-off transaction must satisfy judicially
created limitations: first, nonrecognition is available only if the distribution is carried out
for an independent corporate business purpose, Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (2011); second,
the shareholders prior to the spin maintain adequate continuity of interest in both the
parent and subsidiary; and third, the continuity of business enterprise is maintained after
the spin. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.355-1(b), 1.355-2(c) (2011).
53
See Paul, supra note 8, at 104.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See Trinklein & Kelly, supra note 51, at 189.
58
Id.
59
Amy Chapman, IRS Issues “No-Rule” Order on Several Section 355 Transactions,
KPMG REPORT, at 4 (June 17, 2013), http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights
/ArticlesPublications/taxnewsflash/Documents/061713-no-rule-355.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/43CR-778U.
60
Id.
61
Id.
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parent corporation retains the cash from the debt issuance while its related
debt has been retired using the subsidiary’s securities.
No basis limitation is imposed on the parent’s receipt of the subsidiary’s
securities regardless of what the basis of the parent corporation in the subsidiary’s assets is.62 Accordingly, the parent corporation is able to extract
value from its subsidiary to the extent that its newly issued debt exceeds the
subsidiary’s assets basis, in circumstances that would otherwise trigger the
recognition of gain to the parent.63
Because of the inherently difficult nature of the leveraged spin-off transactions and careful tax planning involved, the Service, until recently, has
been willing to provide the corporate taxpayers and their advisors with some
guidance in the form of private letter rulings formulating the Service’s stand
on a particular transaction.64 Numerous private rulings have approved
leveraged spin-off structure.65 At the beginning, the Service issued such rulings only when the debt of the parent corporation that was exchanged for
the subsidiary’s debt was historic debt, not incurred as part of the transaction, and only when the parent corporation did not increase its debt in contemplation of the transaction “other than in the ordinary course of its business
as necessary to meet its working capital and similar needs.”66 As a practical matter, however, holders of the historic debt could well be reluctant to
swap the parent’s debt for the debt of the subsidiary—such debt generally
would involve a different issuer in a different business and terms of maturity, interest rate, and other characteristics that are different from those
of the parent’s debt.67 In light of these concerns, a practice emerged for a
“friendly” investment bank to purchase the parent’s historic debt from the
existing holders and exchange it for the subsidiary’s debt.68
62

The parent corporation will not recognize gain or loss on the transfer of the subsidiary’s stock or securities in exchange for the parent’s debt, provided that all conditions are
satisfied. I.R.C. § 361(a). If the parent’s debt is a security and holders receive no “excess
principal amount,” then the exchange is also tax-free to the parent’s debt holders. I.R.C.
§ 355(a)(3)(A).
63
Trinklein & Kelly, supra note 51, at 189.
64
See discussion infra Part IV.
65
See infra notes 67, 69.
66
Chapman, supra note 59, at 4 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.382-9(d) (1994)). See also, e.g.,
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-45-050 (Nov. 7, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-16-024
(Apr. 20, 2007).
67
See Paul, supra note 8, at 104.
68
See id.; see, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-32-001 (Apr. 30, 2008) (step 5); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-47-012 (Aug. 28, 2007) (step (6)); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-32-002
(May 11, 2007). The Service permitted these transactions by referencing to a practice,
which had evolved years earlier in the area of stock-for-debt exchanges under section
108. See Gary B. Wilcox, Issuing Mixed Consideration in Troubled Debt Restructuring,
10 VA. TAX REV. 357, 371–75 (1990). Prior to the enactment of section 108(e)(10) pursuant to the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 59, 98 Stat. 494 (1984),
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Recent incarnations of the debt-for-debt exchange transactions which
were approved by the Service—the so-called 5/14 Plans—involved scenarios
in which the parent corporation issued short-term debt to an investment bank,
in exchange for cash, for five days.69 The parent corporation and the bank
then would enter into a debt-for-debt exchange agreement, under which they
would agree in another eleven days to exchange the newly issued parent’s
debt for the subsidiary’s securities, which the bank subsequently would sell in
the market.70 The Service consistently concluded that such transactions will
be allowed a tax-free treatment so long as the taxpayer represented that the
parent corporation did not artificially increase its leverage in anticipation of
the spin-off71 and the parties respected the five-day interval between the debt
issuance and the entry into the exchange agreement, as well as the fourteenday interval between the debt issuance and the debt repurchase.72 The importance placed upon the day-counting representations by the corporate
the issuance by a corporation of stock in exchange for its own debt generally did not
result in cancellation of debt income. See id. Accordingly, a corporation that wanted to
take advantage of this rule would issue stock to a friendly investment bank that had
recently purchased the corporation’s debt from the existing third-party debt holders. See
Paul, supra note 8, at 104. In response, by enacting section 108(e)(10), the Service required the investment bank to hold the debt for a period of time in order to demonstrate
that they were true creditors. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-38-003 (May 22, 1987); I.R.S.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-35-007 (May 18, 1987); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-35-006 (May 18,
1987) (the bank’s acquisition of debt preceded execution of the exchange agreement by
anywhere from three days to over four months). See also J. William Dantzler Jr., Spinoffs:
Still Remarkably Tax Friendly, 129 TAX NOTES 683, 689 (2010), available at http://www
.whitecase.com/files/Publication/86b9a23d-00ac-4550-b3c9-bb0b7ba20c9f/Presentation/Pub
licationAttachment/0cab9161-7498-4074-994d-c43ad0b2aaf1/Article_Spinoffs_Still_Re
markably_Tax_Friendly.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E537-SMLE (noting that the techniques of the early 1980s, under which banks purchased the outstanding debt prior to any
binding obligation to consummate the exchange, have been applied to spin-offs).
69
See Trinklein & Kelly, supra note 51, at 189; see also Chapman, supra note 59.
70
See Trinklein & Kelly, supra note 51, at 189. To obtain an approval from the Service
for these types of transactions, corporate taxpayers would have to represent that the spinoff would not take place until at least five days following the issuance of the parent’s
debt, and that this newly issued debt would be held for at least fourteen days before the
parent’s debt lenders were redeemed out for the subsidiary’s securities. See Rizzi, IRS
Opens the Gates, supra note 13, at 26.
71
Generally, taxpayers would be able to prove the legitimacy of the transaction by demonstrating that the total amount of the debt exchanged in the transaction does not exceed
the average amount of the parent’s debt outstanding in the previous year. See Elliott, ABA
Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off, supra note 12; see also Robert Willens,
Ralcorp’s Plans for Its Retained Post Shares Revealed in Ruling, 134 TAX NOTES 1273
(2012),
http://www.robertwillens.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/report.detail/articleID/f899110
b-b85a-4d7e-b103-576360741f53.
72
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2012-32-014 (Aug. 10, 2012); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-32009 (Aug. 12, 2011); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-29-005 (July 22, 2011); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 2010-32-017 (Aug. 13, 2010); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-02-009 (Jan. 11, 2008).
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taxpayers reflects an attempt by the Service to test whether the parties to
the transaction—the parent corporation, subsidiary, and debt lender(s)—
should be treated as bearing real economic risk, with the focus on whether
the parent’s debt could be safely treated for tax purposes as actually
“owned” by the debt lenders acting for their own account.73
It appears then that in approving 5/14 Plan structures, the Service has
applied a narrow version of the step transaction doctrine,74 which permits
an integration or re-characterization of a series of separate transactional
steps for federal income tax purposes “if the steps are closely related and
undertaken with a view to a common objective.”75 Under a traditional step
transaction doctrine analysis, the newly issued parent’s debt would not be
respected generally if it is issued only to be subsequently redeemed.76 Accordingly then, one could argue that under the 5/14 Plan, although the agreement with the lending bank to exchange debt is not entered into until five
days after the issuance of the parent’s debt, the redemption of the debt
may be viewed as the end result, and the issuance and redemption of the
debt as mutually interdependent.77 This suggests the possibility of an application of the step transaction doctrine to the 5/14 structures, under which
the newly issued debt would not be respected.78
The Service, however, seems to take the view that, because the debt lenders subject themselves to the risks for fourteen days and there is no binding
agreement to future exchange at the time the debt is issued since the exchange
agreement is entered only five days after the issuance of the new debt, the
step transaction doctrine would respect the debt.79 The readily apparent
availability of these types of logical-on-their-surface arguments, however,
lie at the heart of the disagreement among tax practitioners with respect to
73

See Rizzi, IRS Opens the Gates, supra note 13, at 26.
See Paul, supra note 8, at 105.
75
See Sowell & Kiggen, supra note 14, at 4. The step transaction doctrine is a judicially created doctrine originating from a principal established and discussed in Part I of the
case Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), which allowed the court to re-characterize a
tax-motivated transaction. See Sowell & Kiggen, supra note 14, at 13. Where the doctrine
applies to integrate a series of formally separate transactional steps, it operates to prevent the
division of a single transaction into its parts in a manner that frustrates the purposes of a
given Code provision. See Sowell & Kiggen, supra note 14, at 5. Additionally, the doctrine
applies to re-characterize a transaction as a different, but economically equivalent, transaction, by ignoring the intervening stops in a multi-step transaction. Id.
76
See Paul, supra note 8, at 105.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. Indeed, in Comm’r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968), the Supreme Court stated
that in order for there to be a “first step” in a step transaction, “there must be a binding
commitment to take the later steps.”
74
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the tax-free treatment of the leveraged spin-offs,80 and perhaps, inflicted
the recent No-Rule policy development.81
III. DISAGREEMENT AMONG PRACTITIONERS
The recent developments in the treatment of the leveraged spin-off
transactions led to disagreements among practitioners about whether the
taxpayer-favorable position taken by the Service in the 5/14 Plan rulings
and other similar rulings dealing with corporate divisions were consistent
with fundamental tax principles that would generally indicate taxable exchange treatment for these transactions.82
At the root of the division among the practitioners’ views is the intricate relationship between two fundamental tax policy principles.83 On one
hand, the Code provided incentives for corporate restructurings by affording tax-free treatment for spin-offs and corporate reorganizations.84 On the
other, the Code imposes tax where a taxpayer disposes of property and
receives cash in excess of the taxpayer’s basis in such property.85 With
this background in mind, some practitioners argue that the parent’s shift of
debt to the subsidiary in excess of the parent’s basis is equivalent to the
receipt of cash in excess of basis and thus is a squarely appropriate circumstance for imposition of tax.86 Accordingly, they argue, leveraged spinoff transactions can be purely tax motivated.87 Those practitioners supporting
the current tax-free treatment of the transactions counter that there are compelling policy reasons to permit flexibility in the structuring of corporate
divisions.88 This Note summarizes the reasoning of both groups below.
A. Arguments Supporting the Tax-Free Treatment of Leveraged
Spin-Off Transactions
Strong arguments can be made in support of the current tax-free treatment of the leveraged spin-off transactions.89 Despite the obvious tax benefits
80

See Paul, supra note 8, at 99.
Id.
82
Id. at 100.
83
See Trinklein & Kelly, supra note 51, at 188.
84
I.R.C. §§ 355, 368 (2012).
85
I.R.C. § 1001 (2012).
86
See infra Part III.B.
87
See Paul, supra note 8, at 105; see also Elliott, ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off, supra note 12.
88
See Elliott, ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off, supra note 12.
89
See, e.g., Candace A. Ridgeway, Myths and Legends of “RMT” Spinoffs, 53 TAX
MGM’T MEMO. 179, 180 (2012) (arguing that even spin-offs coupled with mergers represent
81
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of spin-offs, numerous reasons indicate why companies pursue these transactions, most of which are consistent with directors’ and officers’ fiduciary
duty to maximize shareholder value and have nothing to do with federal taxation.90 By virtue of the “business purpose” requirement,91 spin-offs always
have a legitimate business purpose and stem from legitimate business considerations rather than tax planning alone.92 In fact, many tax practitioners
support the view that imposing a basis limitation on the amount of leverage
that can be shifted to a subsidiary may interfere with the bona fide business
and economic capital structure for the parent company and the corporation it
controls.93 After all, as the parent company reduces its asset base, as an economic matter, it should be able to shed some of the corporate group’s debt
and business considerations, rather than the Code setting an artificial limit
on the basis, and it should determine the amount of debt that is shifted.94
Another strong argument supporting the current tax-free treatment of
leveraged spin-off transactions is that, in line with the general policy behind
readjustments in structure that generally should be entitled to tax deferral); Neil J. Barr,
Uncertainty Regarding the Tax Treatment of Liabilities in Divisive Reorgs Survives the
AJCA, 105 TAX NOTES 1125, 1130 (2004) (arguing that where the parent corporation exchanges subsidiary’s securities for its own debt, the holders retain “a continuing economic
interest in a historic distributing corporation’s business, which, under general principals is
not the occasion for a recognition event”).
90
See Edward S. Adams & Arijit Mukherji, Spin-Offs, Fiduciary Duty, and the Law,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 15, 16, 39 (1999) [hereinafter Adams & Mukherji].
91
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (2011).
92
See Paul, supra note 8, at 101.
93
See Amy S. Elliott, Practitioners Wary on Transportation Bill’s Anti Reverse Morris
Trust Provision, 134 TAX NOTES 1371, 1372 (2012) [hereinafter Elliott, Practitioners
Wary] (citing the view of a mergers and acquisition tax practitioner that the perception
that taxpayers are using leverage to enable “a cashing out” fundamentally fails to appreciate the economics of a separation and the policy of section 361 because a parent corporation must divide its debt between the parent and subsidiary in order to effectuate the
distribution). “[T]here are policy reasons for the tax law to facilitate corporate separations
when the two businesses have different capital structures.” See Elliott, ABA Meeting:
Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off, supra note 12 (citing Thomas F. Wessel of KPMG LLP).
94
See Elliott, ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off, supra note 12 (citing
Thomas F. Wessel of KPMG LLP). Supporters of this view additionally refer to the fact
that in enacting section 355(e), designed to prevent the avoidance of corporate tax on prearranged sales of corporate stock, Congress avoided imposition of any additional restrictions on the amount or proportion of liabilities that could be shifted in connection
with a spin-off transaction. See Robert A. Rizzi, Debt to Creditors: The Ongoing Debate
Over Nonstock Payoffs in Spinoffs, J. CORP. TAX’N 18, 23 (2011) [hereinafter Rizzi, Debt
to Creditors]. Thus, it appears that Congress avoided second-guessing allocations of indebtedness between and among parties to spin-off transactions presumably in part due to
the fact that tax regulators were suspicious of imposing their own standards on the appropriate terms of commercial financial transactions, whether within a corporate family or
between corporations and third-party lenders. Id.
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section 355, the Code should not stand in the way of divisive transactions,
which can make businesses smaller, more manageable, and, thus, more competitive.95 Indeed, in a large industrialized society such as ours, it is beneficial for corporations to disaggregate their assets without significant tax
impediments, as the businesses’ larger sizes are not always optimal from
the operational and capital structure perspectives.96 This is especially true
in the context of publicly traded companies, which often desire to separate the
parent and its subsidiaries so they each can devote their attention to a single line of business.97 Indeed, a more narrowly focused company may have
greater success and increased incentive for managers to perform due to its
ability to devote more energy and attention to the single enterprise.98 Accordingly, one can argue that, based on these business considerations, the
Code should promote divisive transactions99 just as it facilitates acquisitive reorganizations.100
Additionally, it is often the case that corporate parties use spin-off
transactions as an integral part of acquisitive reorganizations with spin-off
transactions being a first step in restructuring the relevant businesses so
the acquisitive reorganization can occur.101 Retaining the tax-free treatment
of the spin-offs then appears to be perfectly sensible in light of the Code’s
general policy of facilitating acquisitive transactions.102
The example of yet another argument supporting the current tax-free
regime is based on the notion that spin-off transactions do not deplete the
corporate tax basis, as no assets leave the corporate solution.103 In a spin-off
transaction, income from the assets that both were transferred by the parent
company to its subsidiary and remained in the parent company is still subject
to the corporate-level tax, and thus it would be senseless to trigger gain
95

See Bennett, supra note 8.
See Paul, supra note 8, at 101.
97
See SCHWARZ & LATHROPE, supra note 24, at 819.
98
Id.
99
See Karla W. Simmon & Daniel L. Simmons, The Future of Section 355, 40 TAX
NOTES 291, 293 (1988) (arguing that the degree to which the corporate shareholder’s relationship to corporate assets is changed in the corporate “divorce” does not differ significantly from the change in the shareholders’ relationship to corporate assets in corporate
“marriage,” thus the logic that supports the nonrecognition treatment in acquisitive reorganizations should equally apply to divisive transactions).
100
I.R.C. §§ 361(a), 368 (2012).
101
See Paul, supra note 8, at 102.
102
Id. (reasoning that such argument could be rationally entertained where the target
business is separated from another business previously held under the same corporate
umbrella in order to facilitate the consolidation of such target business with the acquirer,
and both steps are motivated by an identical, genuine business rationale).
103
“It isn’t a sale transaction but a new corporation with some of the same assets and
all of the same shareholders ....” Elliott, ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off,
supra note 12 (citing Matthew A. Rosen of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP).
96
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recognition at the time of the spin-off.104 Accordingly, while the repeal of
General Utilities stands for the proposition that gain should be recognized
when assets leave corporate solution, the policy has been to disregard spinoffs as proper occasion for recognizing gain.105 Similarly, in the context of
leveraged spin-offs, to effect a distribution, the debt must be divided between
a parent corporation and a subsidiary and debt transferred to the subsidiary
in excess of basis merely represents a portion of the gain in the parent’s
stock, which Congress did not intend to tax at the time of a spin-off.106
B. Arguments Supporting the Taxation of Leveraged Spin-Off Transactions
Corporate taxpayers favor a debt-for-debt exchange in the context of
the leveraged spin-off transactions because section 355107 does not limit the
amount of securities that the subsidiary can issue, or the amount of historic
debt that the parent company can retire with the subsidiary’s securities.108
Thus, the parent corporation can maximize the value it extracts from its
subsidiary by utilizing a debt-for-debt exchange as part of a combination of
monetization strategies.109
Practitioners, however, disagree about whether the taxpayer-favorable
position of the Service in the 5/14 Plan rulings, and in the similar rulings
104

See Paul, supra note 8, at 102.
See, e.g., Robert A. Rizzi, The Fuss About Morris Trust: Spin-Off Transactions As
Acquisition Techniques, 23 J. CORP. TAX’N 303, 306 (1997) [hereinafter Rizzi, Fuss About
Morris Trust] (describing the view that the repeal of General Utilities “only means that
gain should be recognized when corporate assets leave ‘corporate solution,’” because when
assets remain in corporate solution, basis is preserved).
106
See Elliott, Practitioners Wary, supra note 93 .
107
In conjunction with section 368.
108
I.R.C. §§ 361(b)(3), 357(c) (2012); see generally Robert Willens, Corporate Reorganizations: Careful Negotiation of Rules Required in Retiring Debt in Connection with
Spin Off, BNA DAILY TAX REP., at J-1 (July 7, 2008). But see Tax Reduction and Reform Act
of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 3703 (2007) (proposal by Rep. Rangel, Chairman of
the House Ways and Means Committee, to treat controlled securities as money or other
property, which would limit the amount of controlled securities (and any other boot) to
the basis in the assets that the parent company contributes to the subsidiary in the D reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(D), a reorganization in which the parent corporation,
after transferring substantially all of its assets to the subsidiary, completely liquidates);
The American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. (2010)
(proposal to treat debt securities issued by a controlled subsidiary in a divisive D reorganization that exceed asset basis as triggering gain recognition). Eric Solomon, a former
Treasury official, however, believes that such change in law would be an unwarranted extension of the section 357(c) policy, requiring recognition of gain where the liability to
which contributed to a newly formed subsidiary property is subject exceeds the basis of all
property contributed, because the stock basis of the controlled corporation disappears in
section 355 distribution. See Amy S. Elliott, Extenders Proposal Targets Debt Securities
Issues in Spinoffs, 2010 TNT 191-1 (Oct. 4, 2010).
109
See Paul, supra note 8, at 104.
105

704

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:687

concerning leveraged spin-offs, is consistent with fundamental tax principles that would generally indicate taxable exchange treatment for such transactions.110 Perhaps the strongest argument supporting the view that leveraged
spin-offs can be purely tax motivated is that where the parent company
shifts its debt to its subsidiary in excess of basis, it monetizes all or some
part of its investment because such a transfer involves a disposition for cash
in excess of basis—a straightforward case for recognition of gain.111
Additionally, responding to the business purpose argument against current taxation of the leveraged spin-offs, some practitioners argue that “the
existence of a business purpose and the fact that economic pressures drive
capital structure” and the proper imposition of tax are not mutually exclusive events.112 Moreover, in response to the argument that the Code should
facilitate divisive corporate restructurings, one may argue that promotion
of “divorces” of the companies should not lead to giving a “free pass” when
the parent company is cashing out as the result of the spin-off.113
Responding in the same manner to the argument that all assets remain
in the corporate solution, one can counter that if the Code were to include a
concept aimed at affording tax-free treatment to the transaction between related corporations as long as assets remained in corporate domain, then sale
transactions by a corporation to another corporation would not be taxed, contrary to the current law.114 Accordingly, where the parent company receives cash in excess of basis as the result of the spin-off transaction, the
fact that assets do not leave the corporate domain should not prevent taxation of the transaction.115
110

See Elliott, ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin-Off, supra note 12.
See, e.g., Rizzi, Debt to Creditors, supra note 94, at 18 (arguing that where the parent
company repays its debt with securities of its subsidiary, it improves its balance sheet on
a pretax basis: “[The parent] is able indirectly to use assets with built-in gain, translated
through the medium of [Subsidiary] debt securities, to monetize its investment without
triggering tax”). In fact, some practitioners point out that the Service ought to impose a basis
limitation on the leveraged spin-offs involving securities-for-debt exchanges. See Paul,
supra note 8, at 100. Such an amendment would not be desirable for those who support
the view that the Code should facilitate leverage shifts in spin-offs, as the imposition of
basis limitation on the transactions would undermine corporate taxpayers’ abilities to
achieve desirable capital structures for the parent company and the subsidiary. Id.
112
See Paul, supra note 8, at 102 (pointing out that most sale transactions have a
business purpose which does not preclude its taxable treatment).
113
Id.
114
“The Code does not view the corporate tax base as a whole as a single taxpayer such
that assets may be moved around within it without triggering tax.” Paul, supra note 8.
Each corporation is treated as a separate taxpayer and dispositions by a single corporation
of appreciated assets is a recognition event, regardless of whether the assets remain in the
corporate domain. I.R.C. §§ 11(a), 1001 (2012).
115
See, e.g., Rizzi, Fuss About Morris Trust, supra note 105, at 305–06 (describing the
view of many commentators and individuals in the Service and Treasury that “any movement
of assets from the corporate owner, unless such movement falls within a specific statutory
111
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One of the practitioners suggested that if lawmakers were to rewrite the
law, they might consider one of four possible approaches to determining the
result when the parent corporation received cash exceeding its basis in spinning off the subsidiary: first, the alter ego theory, under which the spin-off
is not taxable because both the parent company and subsidiary remain in
corporate solution with essentially the same shareholders; second, the sale
theory Variant One, under which the spin-off would be taxable if the parent
company receives cash in excess of its basis in the subsidiary; third, the sale
theory Variant Two, under which the spin-off would be taxable if there is a
separate pool of assets combining with one of the two companies; and fourth,
the sale theory Variant Three, under which the spin-off would be taxable if
the parent company received cash in excess of its basis in the subsidiary and
there is a separate pool of assets combining with the leveraged company.116
Regardless of their consistency with each other, the Service has not embraced
any of the approaches and none of them is reflected in the current law.117
While the different views regarding the leveraged spin-offs were floating around in the tax community for quite some time, the Service’s position
on the tax-free treatment of the transactions remained intact provided the
transactions were structured in a manner eligible for beneficial tax treatment.118 Thus, the corporate taxpayers weighing tax-free spin-offs have long
relied on comforting rulings from the Service.119 Recently, however, the
Service announced significant limitations to its ruling policy with respect to
spin-offs—the development that stumped many practitioners and left the
companies more reliant on the judgment of tax advisors, rather than the
blessings of regulators, when structuring deals as spin-offs.120
IV. THE 2013 NO-RULE LIST: IMPLICATIONS FOR
LEVERAGED SPIN-OFF TRANSACTIONS
As discussed in Part II of this Note, many leveraged spin-off transactions, especially in the public context, have proceeded on the basis of receiving a favorable letter ruling from the Service addressing the transactions’
qualifications under section 355.121 In January 2013, however, the Service
scheme, should trigger corporate-level gain” even if the assets do not leave corporate
solution). See also Melissa C. McCann, Section 355 in a Post-General Utilities World:
The Victim of an Overreaction?, 23 J. CORP. TAX’N 137, 158 (1996) (acknowledging that
deferral is a tax benefit that should be available only in special circumstances).
116
See Paul, supra note 8, at 103.
117
See Elliott, ABA Meeting: Code Distorts Leveraged Spin Off, supra note 12.
118
See Hoffman, supra note 3.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
See discussion infra Part II.
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announced significant limitations to its ruling policy with respect to spinoffs by updating its so-called No-Rule policy—an annual revenue procedure
listing the matters on which the Service will not issue private letter rulings.122 The Revenue Procedure 2013-3 listed three new “areas under study in
which rulings ... will not be issued until the Service resolves the issue
through publication of a revenue ruling, a revenue procedure, regulation,
or otherwise.”123 Specifically, the 2013 No-Rule List announced that the
Service will no longer issue rulings concerning whether a debt-for-debt
exchange in connection with a leveraged spin-off transaction is tax-free
where new debt of the parent corporation is issued as part of the transaction under the 5/14 Plan, or otherwise “in anticipation of the distribution.”124
Although the announcement that the issue was under study did not
change the tax-free treatment of leveraged spin-offs, to many tax practitioners the news was significant as it signaled that the Service potentially
viewed the transactions as problematic, causing great uncertainty regarding their future treatment.125 Indeed, the comments from the Service’s
officials addressing the ruling were not particularly comforting and suggested that the limitations stem from the concerns discussed in Part III.126
For example, one of the Service’s corporate counsels explained that the
No-Rule announcement meant that the Service would be rethinking the
transaction “pretty much from scratch” and that, as the result of the study,
“[the Service] might come out in a different place” and is “not going to be
bound by where [the Service was].”127 Similarly, another Service’s counsel referred to the Service becoming aware of “something special” under
section 355 as one of the reasons for the No-Rule policy.128 It appears that
the Service’s identification of “something special” began with the increased
122

Rev. Proc. 2013-3, 2013-1 I.R.B. 113 (Jan. 2, 2013).
Id. § 5.
124
Id. § 5.01(10) of Rev. Proc. 2013-3 stated that Private Letter Rulings will not be
issued on “[w]hether either § 355 or § 361 applies to a distributing corporation’s distribution of stock or securities of a controlled corporation in exchange for and in retirement of,
any putative debt of the distributing corporation if such distributing corporation debt is
issued in anticipation of the distribution.”
125
See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 3 (citing Steve Gordon’s comparison of the leveraged spin-off rulings to a security blanket absent which companies would hesitate to engage
in the transaction); Cummings, supra note 11 (stating that the changes brought about by
the 2013 No-Rule List are significant in that they can signal that the Service may think
the transaction is problematic).
126
See discussion infra Part III.
127
See Amy S. Elliott, ABA Meeting: Practitioners Parse Implications of Expanded
Corporate No-Rule Policy, 2013 TNT 19-1 (Jan. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Elliott, ABA Meeting:
Expanded Corporate No-Rule Policy] (citing Mark Weiss, branch 6 attorney, IRS Office
of Associate Chief Counsel (Corporate)).
128
See Bennett, supra note 7.
123
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interest of practitioners in the transaction.129 Both counsels admitted that,
while the Service does not intend to provide a bright-line rule on what is
considered “in anticipation of the distribution,” it will be “skeptical” of any
debt issued at any time following a taxpayer’s announcement to do a spinoff.130 To add to practitioners’ concerns, one of the counsels suggested
that in structuring a leveraged spin-off transaction, the mere uncertainty on
the part of a structuring counsel of whether issuance of debt falls within a
broad definition of words “issued in anticipation of the distribution,” most
likely means that, in fact, the debt was issued “in anticipation of the distribution” and the transaction is within the scope of the No-Rule ruling.131
Despite the concerns raised by the new No-Rule policy, the leveraged
spin-off transactions that would fall within the scope of the ruling are not
necessarily unworkable as lawyers may still be able to render opinions regarding their structure.132 Proceeding with a particularly complex leveraged
spin-off transaction solely on the basis of a counsel’s opinion and without any
significant input from the Service, however, is problematic and may cause
companies’ hesitation in engaging in these transactions.133 In fact, the trend of
a “chilling effect” on leveraged spin-off deals was noticed immediately
after the ruling was issued.134
The Service significantly expanded the No-Rule policy in June 2013
when it issued a revenue procedure,135 which significantly restricted the
circumstances under which the Service was willing to issue the rulings on
whether a corporate separation satisfied the requirements for section 355
tax-free treatment.136 The Service expressed that the purpose of this change
was to conserve the Service’s resources137 though taxpayers could still seek
a letter ruling if the corporate separation involved a “significant issue.”138
129

According to IRS Associate Chief Counsel William Alexander, if the transaction is
“that interesting, then obviously that’s going to cause [the Service] to take another look at
[it].” Elliott, ABA Meeting: Expanded Corporate No-Rule Policy, supra note 127.
130
See Bennett, supra note 7. It is possible, however, that the Service would not consider “old and cold” debt to be issued in anticipation of distribution. Id.
131
See Elliott, ABA Meeting: Expanded Corporate No-Rule Policy, supra note 127
(citing Mark Weiss).
132
See id.
133
According to one tax practitioner, “[o]pinion letters [from counsel] only get you so
far, especially in an environment where companies are afraid of finding themselves on the
front page of the Wall Street Journal for having a deal that’s challenged.” See Hoffman,
supra note 3 (citing Gregory Kidder, a tax partner with Steptoe & Johnson LLP).
134
Id.
135
Rev. Proc. 2013-32, 2013-28 I.R.B. 55 (July 8, 2013).
136
Id.
137
Id. at § 1.
138
Id. § 2.01. The No-Rule ruling defined the term “significant issue” as an issue that
is not clearly and adequately addressed by a statute, regulation, or other authority; the
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By strengthening the standard under which the issuance of private letter
rulings was allowed for section 355 transactions generally, the Service
clarified when the taxpayers were still able to obtain a favorable ruling on
certain crucial aspects of their corporate separations.139 The procedure,
however, provided no such clarification regarding the issuance of the
rulings on leveraged spin-off transactions and the effect of the No-Rule
policy regarding those transactions has yet to be fully determined.140 The
No-Rule policy changes for spin-off transactions were later incorporated
in the Revenue Procedure 2014-3.141 Meanwhile, some practitioners logically suggest that the Service should consider issuing published guidance
in areas relevant to leveraged spin-off transactions yet continue to rule
privately, at least until taxpayers become more familiar with the published
guidance standards.142
CONCLUSION
Proponents of leveraged spin-off transactions endorse their longevity
because they promote economic efficiency and encourage expansion in an
extremely competitive market.143 Opponents of the transactions disapprove of
how inventive tax planners have wielded them to take appreciated assets out
of a corporation tax-free.144 The changes brought about by the No-Rule
policy are significant as they may signal that the Service thinks the transaction is problematic. Indeed, the changes reflect the first administrative cut
back on the “burgeoning expansion” of section 355 as a preferred tax relief
section in a long time.145
There is much worry among practitioners surrounding the implication
of the recent changes and the fact remains that the system is inefficient and
resolution of which is not essentially free from doubt; and that is legally significant and germane to determining the tax consequences of the transaction. Rev. Proc. 2013-3 § 3.01(41)
(Jan. 2, 2013). The Revenue Procedure 2013-32 expanded the definition by eliminating the
requirement that the issue be one that is not clearly and adequately addressed by the authorities but required the taxpayers to provide an analysis of relevant law most closely related to
the issue and explain why these authorities do not resolve it. Rev. Proc. 2013-32 §§ 4.01(3),
5.01(1) (July 8, 2013).
139
Rev. Proc. 2013-32 §§ 4.01(3), 5.01(1) (July 8, 2013).
140
See May & Nader, supra note 21.
141
Rev. Proc. 2014-3 §3.01(45) (Jan 2, 2014).
142
See Paul, supra note 8. Paul, citing to Revenue Procedure 2003-48, supports this argument by referring to the replacement of the Service’s historical practice of issuing private
letter rulings determining whether a particular transaction satisfied the “business purpose”
requirement, with a published guidance in 2003. Id.
143
See Adams & Mukherji, supra note 90, at 16.
144
See Paul, supra note 8, at 102–03.
145
See Cummings & Tanenbaum, supra note 11.
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uncertain because many of the rules are inherent in the Service’s ruling
practice. Corporate taxpayers must incur the time and expense of seeking
rulings for many transactions, because advisors applying traditional doctrine and analyses would not be able to provide the level of comfort the parties seek. Under the circumstances, the tax world would be better off if the
Service provided more guidance regarding the treatment of the leveraged
spin-off transactions.

